Copper-cobalt mining and processing infrastructure in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
By Charles Pitts
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s ban on copper and cobalt concentrate exports has tightened an already fragile supply chain, even though the measure is narrower than a blanket restriction on the country’s refined metal exports.
The order, signed on June 29 and made public on August 6, prohibits the export of copper and cobalt concentrates while allowing the Mines Minister to issue one-year waivers under strategic circumstances. It also introduces a new tax regime for economically significant mining by-products, including a 55% valuation coefficient for trace and ultra-trace minerals recovered during refining.
The timing is significant. Copper is trading above $14,000 per tonne, supported by mine disruptions, constrained concentrate availability, strong grid investment and expanding data-centre demand. At the same time, development work at part of Codelco’s flagship El Teniente mine in Chile could remain suspended for up to two years.
The result is not necessarily an immediate loss of all DRC copper exports. Most of the country’s copper already leaves as refined cathode, while much of its cobalt is exported as hydroxide. But the policy changes the economics of processing, increases the value of domestic smelting capacity and raises the risk premium on every tonne of concentrate moving through the Central African copperbelt.
What the DRC order changes
The new rule targets copper and cobalt concentrates, rather than refined copper cathode or cobalt hydroxide. That distinction matters.
According to the Reuters report carried by Mining Weekly, the ban takes effect immediately, while the by-product tax regime has a three-month transition period. The order was signed by the ministers responsible for mines, foreign trade and the economy as part of a broader effort to retain more mineral value inside the DRC.
The policy also replaces an older system of restrictions and exemptions. Ivanhoe Mines said in a clarification published through Yahoo Finance that a ban on exporting unbeneficiated concentrate had been in place and enforced for close to a decade. Kamoa-Kakula had operated under successive derogations that permitted concentrate exports while domestic processing capacity was being expanded.
The practical difference in 2026 is that the waiver system is now more clearly embedded in the regulatory framework. A company may still export concentrate, but access depends on a time-limited, case-by-case decision based on strategic, technical or economic circumstances.
That creates a new operating variable for miners, traders and lenders: not simply whether an operation has concentrate, but whether it has a valid waiver, when that waiver expires and what conditions attach to it.
The 55% coefficient raises the value of processing
The export ban is only one part of the policy shift.
The new regime for economically significant by-products gives the DRC a mechanism to capture more value from minerals that may be present in small quantities but can carry substantial economic value. For trace and ultra-trace minerals recovered during refining, the order applies a 55% valuation coefficient when calculating the relevant taxable and royalty base.
That matters because modern copper and cobalt circuits often recover more than their headline products. Refining streams can contain minor or strategic metals that were historically treated as secondary credits. Applying a formal valuation coefficient increases the state’s claim on those revenues and makes metallurgical accounting more important.
The three-month transition period should give operators time to adjust reporting, contracts and plant accounting. It does not remove the underlying uncertainty. Companies will still need clarity on product definitions, valuation procedures, allowable deductions and how the coefficient interacts with existing royalties.
For operators considering new processing capacity, the policy creates both an incentive and a cost. Domestic refining can reduce dependence on waivers and protect access to export markets, but it also places more capital, power, reagent and technical requirements inside the DRC.
Winners and losers across the copperbelt
CMOC: less exposed to the concentrate ban
CMOC is the clearest relative winner among the major operators named in the policy debate.
Its Tenke Fungurume operation produces copper cathode and cobalt hydroxide, products that are not directly covered by the concentrate-export prohibition. That does not make CMOC immune to the wider regulatory changes. The company remains exposed to the new by-product tax regime, power and logistics constraints, and any future changes to cobalt quotas or refined-product rules.
But compared with a producer that depends on exporting untreated concentrate, CMOC begins from a stronger position. Its existing product mix reduces the immediate need to secure a new waiver or redirect large volumes into domestic smelting.
That distinction is important for investors and procurement teams. The DRC’s headline production volumes do not reveal the same level of policy exposure across every operator. Product form is now as important as mine ownership.
Glencore: exposed through concentrate and processing arrangements
Glencore faces greater exposure because its DRC copper-cobalt interests are linked to concentrate production and regional processing arrangements.
The company can potentially manage the restriction through existing domestic processing, contractual flexibility and a strategic waiver. However, every additional condition increases execution risk. A delayed waiver could create stockpiles, alter shipment schedules or force material into a domestic circuit that was not designed to absorb the full volume immediately.
The impact will depend on the balance between production and available smelting capacity. If domestic plants can process displaced concentrate reliably, the disruption may be contained. If capacity, power or logistics become bottlenecks, the policy could reduce payable output even while ore continues to be mined.
Ivanhoe: operationally prepared, but still exposed
Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula complex illustrates why the policy should be viewed as a tightening of an existing framework rather than a completely new prohibition.
The company said copper concentrate from Kamoa-Kakula is currently smelted either at the complex’s on-site smelter or at the Lualaba Copper Smelter in Kolwezi. That gives Ivanhoe a stronger domestic-processing position than it had during the operation’s early years.
Even so, the company remains exposed to the pace of the smelter ramp-up, the reliability of local infrastructure and the terms of any remaining derogations. Its Kipushi mine also has a derogation allowing zinc concentrate exports, showing that the DRC’s waiver system can apply across different commodities and projects.
Ivanhoe is therefore neither a clear loser nor fully insulated. Its processing investments reduce the risk, but they do not remove the regulatory dependency.
Hydrometallurgical processing infrastructure highlights the value of domestic refining capacity.
Why the market impact is larger than the tonnage
The DRC exported approximately 696,725 tonnes of refined copper cathode and 53,926 tonnes of copper concentrate in the first quarter of 2026, according to market reporting summarized by S&P Global and other industry sources.
On that basis, the concentrate ban affects a smaller share of the country’s total copper export mix. China also sourced only about 1.9% of its copper concentrate imports from the DRC during the first half of the year.
But copper markets are not priced only on annual tonnage. They are priced at the margin, where a relatively small disruption can affect smelter availability, treatment charges, shipping routes and inventory expectations.
Copper concentrate treatment and refining charges were already under pressure before the announcement. S&P Global reported that clean copper concentrate assessed for delivery to China reached $3,895 per metric tonne on August 6, the highest level since that assessment began in 2021.
That is why the DRC measure can be market-moving even if it does not remove hundreds of thousands of tonnes of refined copper from global supply. It adds friction to a concentrate market already struggling to match smelter demand.
The broader backdrop is covered in Skillings’ analysis of the 2026 copper supply deficit and its copper price outlook. Forecasts remain divided: some institutions see a 2026 refined deficit of roughly 150,000 to 330,000 tonnes, while others expect a modest surplus as high prices stimulate scrap supply and restrain demand.
The DRC ban does not settle that debate. It raises the cost of being wrong on the supply side.
Codelco and El Teniente add to the risk premium
The DRC announcement arrived alongside renewed concerns about Chilean supply.
Trading Economics reported that development at the Andes Norte section of Codelco’s El Teniente mine could remain suspended for as long as two years. The issue affects development in part of the operation rather than representing an outright closure of the entire mine, but it adds to a long list of challenges facing mature Chilean assets: declining grades, deeper underground mining, water constraints and complex capital projects.
Codelco’s difficulties matter because supply losses from multiple large, aging mines can reinforce one another. The DRC restriction affects the form in which material leaves the country. El Teniente’s development setback threatens the timing and reliability of future Chilean output. Together, they strengthen the case for a higher copper risk premium, even if neither event alone creates a global shortage.
Copper scenarios: base, bull and bear
The following framework is intended to show how the DRC policy could interact with broader supply and demand conditions. It is not a price target or investment recommendation.
| Scenario | Copper range | Key assumptions | Market implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base case | $12,500–$15,000/t | Most major DRC operators secure waivers or use domestic smelters; El Teniente disruption is contained; grid and data-centre demand remains firm | Tight concentrate market, elevated but volatile refined prices |
| Bull case | $15,000–$17,000+/t | Waivers are limited, domestic processing bottlenecks emerge, Codelco output disappoints and other mine disruptions persist | Visible inventories fall, TC/RCs remain deeply pressured and buyers compete for prompt units |
| Bear case | $10,000–$12,500/t | Waivers are granted broadly, Kamoa-Kakula and other smelters ramp successfully, demand slows and scrap supply rises | The market absorbs the DRC shock without a sustained refined-metal deficit |
The base case is more complicated than simply assuming the ban removes DRC copper from the market. The key question is whether concentrate is transformed domestically or delayed at the border.
The bull case would require several pressures to arrive at once: restrictive waivers, inadequate processing capacity, further Chilean underperformance and persistent demand from electrification and data centres.
The bear case remains possible because the ban is narrow, the DRC already exports substantial refined product and high prices can release scrap while slowing discretionary industrial demand.
What decision-makers should monitor next
The most important indicators are not only copper prices. Operators, investors and policymakers should track:
- Waiver approvals: Which companies receive one-year derogations, for what products and in what volumes?
- Domestic smelter utilization: Can Kamoa-Kakula, Lualaba and other facilities absorb displaced concentrate consistently?
- By-product implementation: How will the 55% coefficient be applied in practice?
- Treatment and refining charges: Continued weakness would signal persistent concentrate scarcity.
- Codelco execution: The duration of the El Teniente development suspension and its effect on production guidance.
- Refined-market inventories: A sustained drawdown would suggest that concentrate tightness is moving through to cathode availability.
The DRC’s export ban is therefore best understood as a policy shock to the processing chain, not an immediate embargo on copper and cobalt. Its winners are operators with refined-product capacity and regulatory flexibility. Its losers are producers, smelters and traders that rely on uninterrupted concentrate exports.
At more than $14,000 per tonne, the copper market has little tolerance for additional uncertainty. The next test will be whether the DRC’s waiver system and domestic processing network can prevent a regulatory tightening from becoming a physical supply shock.
